SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT DIMENSION
Eugene Gressman *
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a subchapter in the never-ending, ever-confusing
saga of the separation of powers doctrine. It is a little-noticed
but nonetheless significant subchapter written by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. It is composed of
three recent opinions of that court portraying three differing scenarios of the separation maxim: Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (Ameron I);' Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (Ameron JJ);2 and United States v. Frank.3
The main chapters of the separation story are penned of
course by the Supreme Court. The Court has witnessed an increase in separation of powers cases in recent times. Since 1974,
the Court has made at least eleven significant pronouncements
on varying aspects of the doctrine. 4 This concentrated proliferation is due in large part to the executive branch's escalating attempts to use the separation doctrine as a justiciable weapon in
* A.B., 1938, J.D., 1940, Univ. of Michigan. RichardJ. Hughes Visiting Professor of Law, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law. William Rand Kenan Professor of Law
Emeritus, Univ. of North Carolina School of Law. Co-author, R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN, S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (6th ed. 1986). Special counsel to U.S.

House of Representatives in constitutional litigation involving the one-House veto
device, including Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
1 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cerl.
dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988).
2 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988). Ameron II
was a decision on rehearing by the same Third Circuit panel that decided Ameron I.
3 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit has also held, without extended discussion, that separation of powers principles do not preclude Congress
from acting, in accordance with its vested power to regulate territories of the
United States, to authorize the Department of Interior to audit the judicial body
known as the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. Territorial Court of the V.I. v.
Richards, 847 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988).
4 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.
Ct. 2597 (1988); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787
(1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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its long-standing and wide-ranging power struggle with the legislative branch. The executive branch has long exhibited what
Chief Justice Burger once described as the "hydraulic pressure
inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the
outer limits of its power." 5 In the last decade or so, the "hydraulic pressure" within the executive branch has induced it to make
more and more court challenges to congressional legislation that
in some manner steers executive functions away from officials or
agencies under the direct control of the President.
The basic problem facing the Court during this on-going
power struggle has been to accommodate "the enormously complex and varied structure of the federal government, as it has
grown over the years, to the Constitution's provisions for distributing the power of government among three named heads of authority, each of which in contemplation performs a unique
function."' 6 The Court's responses to that problem have fluctuated wildly, almost from case to case, and usually accompanied
by bitter dissents. Sometimes the Court has treated the separation doctrine as requiring a rigid compartmentalization of the
three branches of government. At other times, especially during
the most recent past, the Court has viewed the doctrine as dividing the three departments in a flexible and functional manner,
and as having the capacity to blend the separate powers so as to
create an internal interbranch scheme of oversight, checks and
balances. 7
The three Third Circuit decisions involving the separation
doctrine must be viewed against this explosive and controversial
backdrop of Supreme Court jurisprudence. We first examine the
status of that jurisprudence during the past fifteen years, including the period when the Third Circuit was attempting to divine
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 488 (1987).
7 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
It was shewn in the last paper [The Federalist No. 47] that the political
apothegm there examined [the separation doctrine] does not require
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be
wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next
place, to shew that unless these departments be so far connected and
blended as to give to each a constitutional controul over the others, the
degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free
government, can never in practice, be duly maintained.
5
6
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and follow the Court's violent doctrinal crosswinds. We then
pass judgment on how well the Third Circuit performed its task.
II.

FUNCTIONALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT

Striking vacillations in the Court's approach to the separation doctrine occurred during the reign of Chief Justice Burger.
The Court alternately swung between a literalist or simplistic approach and a functional or pragmatic approach that balances the
conflicting interests of the competing branches. The literalist approach, hewing closely to the constitutional text, is an unruly
child of modern theories of interpretivism. It is grounded in the
belief that the three great branches of government "should be
kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly
blended." 8 On the other hand, the functional version contemplates that Congress "will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government [and] enjoins upon [the] branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 9
As illustrated by its decisions in Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadha 1o and Bowsher v. Synar," the Burger Court was
8 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1923). The A'yers approach was
refined and restated in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), where
the Court declared:
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental
to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive
orjudicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative orjudicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative
power. The existence . . . of occasional provisions expressly giving to
one of the departments powers which fall within the general scope of
another department emphasizes, rather than casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate character of this basic rule.
Id. at 201-02. See Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionniaking.Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1079, 1137 (1988).
9 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
1( 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Chadha Court invalidated the one-House veto device on the simplistic notion that Congress can take action that is "essentially legislative in purpose and effect," and that has "the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,"
only by literally following the bicameral-presentment procedures prescribed by Article I, section 7 of the Constitution. Id. at 952. That so confining the legislative
role of Congress to the bicameral-presentment procedures might "impose burdens
on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable"
was said by the Court to be one of "those hard choices" made by the Framers "who
had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts
to go unchecked." Id. at 959. See generally B. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN
Epic CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE (1988).
II 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Bowsher held that the Comptroller General is sub-
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capable of applying the separation doctrine in its most literal and
formal sense. Such decisions were premised on the notion that
the constitutional language vesting each of the three basic governmental functions in a separate branch is a reflection of the
Framers' respect for Montesquieu's "warning" that "there can be
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or body of magistrates."' 2 Similarly, as
James Madison wrote: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, .... may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny." 13
By this reading of history, if we are to avoid tyranny or the
loss of liberty, we must confine each branch to the performance
of its designated function, with no blending or intermixing of the
three functions unless expressly allowed by the Constitution.
Legislative functions can be performed only by Congress, acting
in a bicameral fashion. Executive functions can be performed
only by the "unitary" Executive, or by those executive agents
subject to the President's direct control. Judicial functions can
be performed only by Article III courts and judges.
But constructing such a strict view of separation on a few
out-of-context remarks by Montesquieu and Madison is both intellectually dishonest and historically inaccurate. This construction is also productive of much mischief in accommodating the
servient to Congress because he is removable only at the initiative of Congress and
thus he could not be assigned any powers or functions that were "executive in nature," pursuant to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). The Comptroller General's functions under
that Act included interpreting the statute and exercising independent judgment as
to the expenditure reductions necessary to reduce the national deficit to the
targeted amounts. Such functions were viewed "as plainly entailing execution of
the law in constitutional terms," and the Comptroller General's decisions were of
the kind "typically made by officers charged with executing a statute." Bowsher, 478
U.S. at 732-33. Thus the Court concluded that "in effect" Congress "has retained
control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function"
contrary to the separation of governmental powers. Id. at 734. The Bowsher Court
also repeated its Chadha proclamation that literal application of the separation doctrine is necessary even though it produces inefficient and even unworkable governmental processes, for "[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives
- or the hallmarks - of democratic government." Id. at 736 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
12 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722. This statement of Montesquieu was also quoted in
early writings of James Madison. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (J. Madison)
(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J-.
Cooke ed. 1961).
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separation doctrine-and it is nothing more than a doctrine, a
maxim, a theory-to the complexities and necessities of modern
government. It is simply wrong to ascribe to those two separation oracles the notion that the functions delegated to each
branch are exercisable only by members of that branch, with no
functional intermixture allowed. In the same Federalist Papers in
which the much-quoted "tyranny warnings" of Montesquieu and
Madison appear, James Madison is quick to add (in a passage
never quoted in such opinions as Chadha and Bowsher) that Montesquieu "did not mean that these departments ought to have no
partialagency in, or no controul over, the acts of each agency," and
that Montesquieu only meant to warn against the exercise of "the
whole power of one department... by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department."' 4 Madison himself
devoted most of his FederalistPaperNo. 47 to a demonstration that

in the states with constitutions emphatically proclaiming the separation axiom "there is not a single instance in which the several
departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and
distinct."' 15 Madison then dedicated his Federalist Paper No. 48 to
the proposition that "unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional controul

over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in practice, be
duly maintained."' 6
A fair and a full reading of the Federalist Papers confirms that
neither Montesquieu nor Madison ever advocated that high walls
forever separate the legislative, executive and judicial functions,
as distinct from the three separate branches or departments created to execute those functions. '7 Rather, they viewed the sepa14 Id. at 325 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977), relied upon this explanation of Montesquieu's vision of the separation doctrine as an affirmation of "the
more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in the Federalist Papers." Nixon, 433
U.S. at 422. Justice Brennan declared further that such approach had earlier been
expressly affirmed by the Court. Id. at 442 n.5 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974)). ChiefJustice Burger, writing a dissenting opinion, disputed the
significance of the Montesquieun reference to one department exercising the "whole
power" of another department, stating that this did not purport to be Montesquieu's total treatment of the separation doctrine. Id. at 511 n.6 (Burger, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's position regarding this historical
debate, see Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682-83 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 327 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
16 Id. at 332.
17

See L.

LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'

CONSTITUTION

391 (1988).
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ration doctrine as a two-part proposition. First, the "whole" of
the vested functions of any one branch must not be exercised by
another branch, for that indeed breeds tyranny. Conversely,
something less than the "whole" of one branch's functions,
though not what we like to call its "core" functions, can be dispersed among the other branches to the extent that Congress
deems it necessary and proper. The original separation doctrine
thus becomes a justification for the modern practice of delegating to one branch or to an independent agency certain functions
or "quasi-functions" that normally belong to another branch.
This process may blur some of the separateness of the three governmental functions. But it makes possible, without doing violence to the original design of the separation doctrine, the
creation of a more efficient governmental structure to achieve
those national policies and programs that Congress believes cannot or should not be administered exclusively by the executive
branch.
The Burger Court's patent refusal in some of its major separation cases to acknowledge and follow the original concept of
separation was undoubtedly one reason that led Justice White,
who has consistently dissented in such cases, to accuse the Court
of having interposed a "distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the Congress and the
President in the legislative process established by the Constitution. ' Justice White has also found the Burger Court guilty of
"constitutional myopia" in its separation analysis.' 9 Other critics
Professor Levy adds: "No Court that cared a fig for original intent and had any
historical competence would have declared the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds [as it did in Bowsher v. Synar]." Id.
at 391-92. The Court's subsequent opinion in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct.
647 (1989), does show much more historical competence, including a more complete reading and awareness of Madison's views as expressed in the Federalist
Papers.
I8 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
19 Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216,
1217 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Process Gas was one of several summary decisions that applied the Chadha precedent to outlaw the use of the one-House veto
device with reference to regulations proposed by independent regulatory agencies.
Justice White characterized these summary cases as casting "further light on the
destructiveness of the Chadha holding." Id. Justice White has written eloquent and
penetrating dissents from the Court's treatment of the separation problems in
three recent cases. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714, 759 (White, J., dissenting); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92
(1982) (White, J., dissenting).
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have found the formalistic separation view "vulnerable to a wide
range of objections relating to the appropriate characterization
of the framers' intent, the problem of interpretative intent, and
the question how intent should be treated in unforeseen
circumstances.' '20
Moreover, the formalistic view simply does not describe accurately how our modern federal government works, how there
must be a constant interplay between the legislative and executive branches. Nor does it permit the kind of interior governmental structure whereby, in Madison's words, the "several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places. ' ' 2 1 Congressional
oversight and internal checks and balances are among the necessities of modern government, and when the Court applies a literalist approach to undermine those necessities either chaos results
or the Court's abstractions are ignored or evaded by the political
branches. The Chadha broadside invalidation of the one-House
veto device is a case in point.2 2
Nowhere have the inadequacies of the literalist approach
been more apparent than when efforts are made to fit the simplistic separation concept into the labyrinths of the modern administrative agency substructure. As Justice Jackson once noted, the
rise of administrative bodies into a veritable fourth branch of
government "has been the most significant legal trend of the last
century . . . [and] has deranged our three-branch legal theories
much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three20 Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101

HARV. L. REv. 421,

493

(1987).

21 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
22 The political branches' need for some kind of a legislative veto procedure

has
continued unabated following the Chadha decision. In the words of one authoritative commentator, Chadha simply "painted with too broad a brush and offered a
simplistic solution [the enactment of new legislation] that is unacceptable to Congress and the agencies." L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 225 (1988).
Fisher's study shows that Chadha inspired the political branches "to find ingenious
and novel methods of achieving basically the same goals: broad delegations of legislative power by Congress to the agencies, checked by congressional controls that
do not need enactment of another law." Id. Among such post-Chadha techniques
are informal and nonstatutory legislative vetoes, convoluted uses of the Senate and
House rulemaking powers, committee vetoes, and vetoes by way of defeating joint
resolutions of approval of administrative action. Fisher notes that from the time of
the Chadha decision in June of 1983 to the end of the 99th Congress in October of
1986, 102 new legislative vetoes, generally the committee-veto variety, were enacted into law in 24 different statutes. Id. Fisher concludes that Chadha thus has
been "eroded by open defiance and subtle evasion"-a situation for which much of
the responsibility "belongs on the doorstep of the Court." Id.
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dimensional thinking. ' 23 With the consistent approval of the
Supreme Court, Congress has delegated to independent agencies many powers that enable a single agency to perform all three
functions - legislative, executive and judicial. A mechanical application of the simplistic separation concept would obviously
doom the whole world of independent agencies, for did not
Madison say that the accumulation of all three governmental
24
functions in the same hands is "the very definition of tyranny"?
A counter development in the separation story became evident during the Burger era, perhaps inspired by the shallowness
and inadequacies of the simplistic version of the doctrine. Without definitively rejecting what it called the archaic or simplistic
version, the Court simultaneously began building upon another
line of decisions that recognized what was described as "the
more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in the Federalist
Papers and later of Mr. Justice Story."' 25 In the decision that heralded this pragmatic rebirth, Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv23 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting). See also M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 10 (1967) ("the emergence of terms such as 'quasi-judicial', 'delegated legislation', or 'administrative justice', . . . represent[s] attempts to adapt the older
[separation] categories to new problems").
24 The logic of the extremist separation doctrine leads to the assertion that all
independent regulatory agencies violate the doctrine. No court has yet accepted
that view. In Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 625 F.Supp. 747
(D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987), an argument was advanced but
not resolved "that the delegation of law enforcement powers to the Federal Trade
Commission is unconstitutional because the Commissioners are given the exclusive
power to initiate enforcement proceedings, and are not subject to the President's
supervisory control." Ticor, 625 F. Supp. at 748.
In the Bowsher case, the majority opinion declared that its affirmance of the
lower court judgment holding the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional
does not require "casting doubt on the status of 'independent' agencies because no
issues involving such agencies are presented here." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4.
In dissent, Justice White stated that this constituted an "apparent unwillingness"
on the Court's part to accept the Solicitor General's argument that executive powers of the sort granted by the Act to the Comptroller "may only be exercised by
officers removable at will by the President." Id. at 760-61 (White, J., dissenting).
Moreover, in the recent Mistretta decision, the Court took pains to make clear that it
does not intend "to undermine our recognition in previous cases and in over 150
years of practice that rulemaking pursuant to a legislative delegation is not the exclusive prerogative of the Executive." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647,
662 n.14 (1989).
25 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977). The Court
there stated that this more pragmatic approach had been "expressly affirmed"
three years earlier when a unanimous Court held that the separate powers "were
not intended to operate with absolute independence" and that it was thejudiciary's
function to resolve the competing interests of the three branches "in a manner that
preserves the essential functions of each branch" while preserving the constitu-
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the Court proceeded to articulate a functional balancing
test in assessing whether a congressional act unduly disrupts the
proper balance between the coordinate branches:
[T~he proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of Congress. 7
ices,26

Despite its later retreat to doctrinal simplicity in Chadha and
Bowsher, the Burger Court - with largely the same personnel
aboard - continued in other cases to refine and hone the Madisonian pragmatic model. The crest of the resurgence of pragmatism
came in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,28 announced
on the same day that ChiefJustice Burger blew the trumpets of literalism in Bowsher v. Synar.29 How so many of the Justices on the same
tional balance of "a workable government."

Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
The Court's reference to Justice Story was to his work entitled COMMENTARIES
CONSTITUTION where he wrote that while separation "is indispensable to
public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant
to affirm that they [the three great departments] must be kept wholly and entirely
separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the
one upon the other, in the slightest degree." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442 n.5 (quoting 1
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 525 (M. Bigelow, 5th ed. 1905)).
In the Nixon footnote, the Court also quoted from THE FEDERALIST No. 47, where
Madison remarked that Montesquieu did not mean that the departments should
have no "partialagency in, or no controul over the acts of each other," and that he
meant that the separation doctrine was subverted only "where the whole power of.
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442 n.5 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47,
at 325-26 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original)).
26 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442.
27 Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
28 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
Justice O'Connor also wrote the opinion for the Court in Thomas v. Union
Carbide Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell and Rehnquist; Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
concurred separately. Thomas involved a statutory scheme whereby private parties
could submit certain compensation disputes, growing out of EPA pesticide registration requirements, to binding arbitration by non-judicial officers, with only limited
review by Article III judges. In sustaining the constitutionality of the scheme, Justice O'Connor "expressly rejected a formalistic or abstract Article III inquiry" in
favor of paying "practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on
formal [separation] categories." Id. at 586-87 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 53 (1932)).
219 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The ChiefJustice's opinion was joined byJustices BrenON THE
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day could take both an archaic and a pragmatic approach to the separation doctrine beggars easy explanation.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Schor brushed aside
the contemporaneous Bowsher decision in an unconvincing fashion.
Bowsher was said to involve a question of "the aggrandizement of
congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch," while
Schor raised a question whether Congress had "impermissibly undermined . . . the role of the Judicial Branch."" 0 But in terms of

separation analysis, Bowsher and Schor are irreconcilable." Bowsher
applied a literalist approach in concluding that the Comptroller
General could not, as an agent of Congress, be delegated executive
functions, regardless of how relatively insignificant the intrusion
upon executive branch functions or how appropriate such intrusion
might be to the accomplishment of the political goal of reducing the
national deficit. Schor, on the other hand, applied a functional approach in concluding that, given the unique aspects and purposes of
the congressional plan to delegate a small portion of Article IIIjudicial power to an independent agency to exercise in the course of its
administrative proceedings, the resulting dilution of the judicial
power of the federal courts posed "no genuine threat" to the institutional integrity of the judicial branch. 3 2 Had Schor followed the
literalist path, the delegation to the agency of even a de minimis
amount ofjudicial power would have been enough to void the intrusion upon the federal courts' express mandate to exercise such
power.
Thus, as the Burger era was fading in 1986, the Court had
painted two quite different faces on the separation doctrine. Bowsher
had divided an amorphous kind of face into three hard edge parts, a
different and sharply contrasting color used on each part, painted
with thick brush strokes with no overlaps. Using the same basic
three-color scheme, Schor had painted a realistic kind of face without
bright lines of distinction, allowing some of the colors to blend together as long as the mix did not result in one color unduly dominating the others or losing the basic integrity of any of them. As the
new Rehnquist era dawned in 1986, the intriguing question was
nan, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justices Stevens and Marshall concurred;
Justices White and Blackmun dissented. For an excellent review of Bowsher and its
implications, see Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar,

1986

DUKE L.J.
30 Schor, 478
31

779.
U.S. at 856-57.

See Strauss, supra note 6, at 488-89 (Bowsher and Schor exemplify "inconsistent

reasoning rules").
32 Schor, 487 U.S. at 857.
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which face and which color scheme the Rehnquist Court would put
upon the separation maxim when it faced its first separation case.
Equally intriguing and perhaps more difficult was the task of the
lower courts, like the Third Circuit, in trying to fathom the separation signals the Court meant to convey in Bowsher and Schor. Should
the lower courts follow the literalist analysis or the functional
analysis?
Somewhat surprisingly, the Rehnquist Court made its choice
rather quickly but quite decisively. In 1988, the Court ruled in Mornson v. Olson 3 3 that, consistent with the separation doctrine, Congress can vest in the judicial branch the appointment of a special
prosecutor to investigate and prosecute ethical indiscretions by high
executive branch officials. In 1989, the Court ruled in Mistretta v.
United States 34 that, consistent with the separation doctrine, Congress can establish a Sentencing Commission, place it within the judicial branch, authorize it to establish nationwide sentencing
guidelines, require designated federal judges to serve on the Commission and to share authority with non-judicial members, and empower the President to appoint the members and remove them for
cause only.
What is significant about the Morrison and Mistretta rulings,
apart from their near-unanimity, is their studied refusal to embrace
the literalist version of the separation doctrine, so warmly endorsed
earlier by the Burger Court in Chadha and Bowsher. Indeed, both
Morrison and Mistretta consciously reiterate, endorse and apply the
functional approach that had been followed in the other line of Burger Court decisions that culminated in Schor.
Thus in Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist - after citing the
Madisonian sources of the pragmatic, functional approach -tested
the separation implications of the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act 3 5 by asking three functional ques-

tions: (1) Does the Act, taken as a whole, involve an attempt by
Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive
Branch? (2) Does the Act, taken as a whole, work any judicial usurpation of properly executive functions? (3) Does the Act, taken as a
whole, "impermissibly undermine" the powers of the executive
branch, or disrupt the proper balance between the coordinate
33 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the
Court. Justice Scalia dissented, and Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.
34 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court.
Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter.

35

28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1987).
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branches by preventing the executive branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions?3 6
Note that the Court does not ask the simplistic question
whether the functions of the independent counsel are essentially executive in nature. Even assuming the functions are executive, the
Court balances the congressional policy of having an independent
inquiry into the ethics of executive branch officials as against the
degree of impact and interference that policy has on the Executive's
ability to perform constitutionally assigned functions. And finding
that the impact and interference are not very substantial, the Court
answered the three questions in the negative and thus validated the
Act.
The Court went through the same functional exercise in Mistretta. This time the Court was even more eloquent and expansive in
its rededication to "Madison's flexible approach to separation of
powers" and in its rejection "as archaic complete division of authority between the three Branches." 3 7 It voiced its adherence to
Madison's teaching "that the greatest security against tyranny - the
accumulation of excessive authority in a single branch - lies not in
a hermetic division between the Branches, but in a carefully crafted
system of checked and balanced power within each Branch." 3 8 The
Framers, said the Court, built into the tripartite government "a selfexecuting safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement
39
of one branch at the expense of the other."Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, then presented questions to test whether the Sentencing Commission provisions violated the encroachment and aggrandizement concerns that have
"animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence. ' 40 First, the
Court asked whether the placement of the Sentencing Commission
within the Judicial Branch constituted an impermissible accumulation or aggrandizement of power within the Judicial Branch. Secondly, the majority questioned whether delegating to the
Commission the task of formulating uniform sentencing guidelines,
which is significantly political and quasi-legislative in nature,
threatened the integrity of the Judicial Branch, or unduly united
political and quasi-legislative power with the judicial power of the
36 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620-22. For a critique of the functional approach
utilized in Morrison, see Liberman, Morrison v. Olsen: A FormalisticPerspective on Why
the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 313 (1989).
37 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 659.
38
39

40

Id.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
Id.
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courts. Moreover, the Court asked whether the statutory requirement that at least three federal judges serve on the Commission and
share their authority with nonjudges undermined the integrity of
the Judicial Branch. Finally, the majority queried whether the
power of the President to appoint and remove Commission members threatened the independence of the Judicial Branch.4
As in Morrison, the Court in Mistretta gave negative answers to
these functional aggrandizement-encroachment questions. The answers were then balanced against the congressional policy of "calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial
Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of
judges." 4 2 And since that policy clearly overbalanced the insignificant aggrandizement and intrusion factors, the Sentencing Commission was held to pass constitutional muster.
Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter in both Morrison and Mistretta,
passionately disassociated himself from the pragmatic approach.
That approach, he protested, treated the Constitution "as though it
were no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of
the Branches should not be commingled too much-how much is
too much to be determined, case-by-case, by this Court."4 3
Justice Scalia would return to the simplistic separation model
whereby the three governmental functions are securely separated at
all times, save when the Constitution specifically allows commingling or blending.4 4 Justice Scalia would thus achieve what he
deems to be the Framers' intent: the executive power is not to be
divided or sapped, and no person or agency not within the complete
control of the Executive can validly exercise any amount or kind of
"executive power."
As of 1989, the simplistic version of the separation doctrine apSee id. at 661-75.
Id. at 675.
43 Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44 Justice Scalia gave as examples of constitutionally authorized commingling:
(i) the presidential veto over legislation, (2) the Senate's confirmation of executive
and judicial officers, (3) the Senate's ratification of treaties, and (4) congressional
power to impeach and remove executive and judicial officers. Id.
UnderJustice Scalia's analysis, since the Constitution vests all legislative power
in the Congress, all executive power in the Executive, and all judicial power in the
federal courts, and since the Constitution does not expressly permit the delegation
of any of these powers to independent agencies or officers outside the branch in
which the particular power is vested, the entire structure of independent administrative agencies comes under a constitutional cloud. The whole nondelegation concept is also implicated. See Carter, The Independent Counsel Aess, 102 HARV. L. REV.
105 (1988); Carter, In Upholding Sentencing Commission, Justices Put Separation of Powers
on the Ropes, MANHATrAN LAw. Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1989, at 13.
41

42
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pears to be on the wane, finding refuge only in the strident Scalia
dissents. Pragmatism seems to reign supreme. It is possible that
both Chadha and Bowsher, insofar as doctrinal analysis is concerned,
in effect have been superceded by the pragmatic analysis in Morrison
and Mistretta. In that overall context, we now turn to an examination
of the three Third Circuit separation decisions.
III.

FUNCTIONALISM AT THE THIRD CIRCUIT

The three Third Circuit decisions were rendered during the
1986-1988 time frame, precisely the period in which the
Supreme Court was crowning the pragmatic separation analysis.
The simplistic version may have suffered its coup de grace on that
day in 1986 when Schor followed hard on the heels of Bowsher. It
is within that period of doctrinal flux that we measure the Third
Circuit's doctrinal performances.
The two Ameron decisions stem from one case, Ameron II representing a shift in separation analysis on a panel rehearing of
Ameron I. The rehearing that produced the shift was motivated by
the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher, rendered
nearly three months after Ameron I, "was contrary to the reasoning of the panel majority in the first Ameron opinion."4 5
The Ameron controversy stemmed from a bitter dispute between the Executive and Legislative Branches about the validity
of certain functions of the Comptroller General under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.46 Under that Act, the Comptroller General was authorized to hear protests from
disappointed bidders on government contracts and, as an incident to such protests, to issue a stay, either of the award to the
successful bidder or of the execution of the contract, pending the
Comptroller's recommendation to the contracting agency as to
45 Ameron II, 809 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297
(1988). Judge Garth, the author of the Ameron I majority opinion, acknowledged in
his concurring opinion in Ameron II that "Bowsher rejected clearly the analysis of the
status of the Comptroller General to which the original majority in Ameron adhered." Ameron 11, 809 F.2d at 999 (Garth, J., concurring).
46 See 41 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253 (Supp. V 1987). The bitterness of the interbranch
dispute was dramatically illustrated by a December 17th, 1984 directive by the executive branch's Office of Management and Budget, acting on the advice of the
Attorney General, that advised all heads of executive departments and agencies to
disregard the stay provisions of the Act that were said to authorize the Comptroller
General to exercise executive authority in violation of the separation doctrine.
Congressional hearings ensued. See Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gov 't Operations of the House Comm. on Gov 't Operations,
99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985). See also Gressman, Take Care, Mr.President, 64 N.C.L.
Rvv. 381 (1986).
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the propriety of the award. The executive branch took the adamant position that this .stay provision conferred executive functions on the Comptroller General, said to be an agent of
Congress, and thus violated the literal separation doctrine.
Circuit Judge Garth, writing the original panel decision in
Ameron I, rejected a literalist approach to the separation problem,
preferring an analysis that focuses "pragmatically on whether the
challenged provision actually or potentially interferes with the
ability of the affected branch to accomplish its constitutionally assigned functions. "' 7 But in applying that pragmatic approach,
Judge Garth treated the Comptroller as functioning "independently of Congress in exercising his role of reviewing bid protests," Congress never having "exerted control over this
process. ' 48 The Comptroller, he said, "cannot neatly be labelled
as totally the creature of one branch or another, ' 49 but rather is
more like an independent "hybrid agency of the kind described
in Humphrey's Executor."5 Thus. under Judge Garth's view of the
role of the Comptroller - which was later to be repudiated by
the Supreme Court in Bowsher - the Comptroller "may constitutionally exercise executive functions in reviewing bid protests because he is appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause and
performs executive duties. '"51
Judge Garth's ultimate conclusion was that "the long history
of [functional] independence" of the Comptroller supports a
judgment that
the stay provision does not operate to permit intrusion by the
legislative branch into executive or judicial decision making.
Thus the delicate balance of power among the branches of
government has not been endangered or upset .. .[and] the
mere existence of the [unexercised] power of Congress to remove the Comptroller General does not render the Comptrol52
ler an agent of Congress for the purpose of this case.
In other words, the exercise of executive power by a hybrid independent type of officer, who Judge Garth likened to an independent administrative agency, does not unduly intrude upon the
47 Ameron 1, 787 F.2d 875, 881 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988)).
48 Ameron 1, 787 F.2d at 885.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 886 (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
5'

Id.

52

Id. at 887.
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functions of the Executive Branch and thus does not violate the
pragmatic separation theory.
Circuit Judge Becker disagreed "fundamentally" with Judge
Garth's functional analysis of the Comptroller's role. The Supreme
Court, said Judge Becker, has never acknowledged that administrative agencies, even the independent regulatory ones, belong to a hybrid constitutional category all their own.5 3 Rather, each agency
and each officer must be fitted into one of the three constitutional
power branches. Judge Becker's analysis of the legislative origins of
the Comptroller's office, including the General Accounting Office
which he heads, led to the conclusion that the legislative intent was
to place and keep the office in the Legislative Branch, exactly the
conclusion reached in Bowsher.54
But instead of ending the matter with a Bowsher-type puerility
that no one in the Legislative Branch can exercise executive power,
Judge Becker slipped into a pragmatic functional mode. The ultimate question, he wrote, "is not merely whether members of one
branch do work falling within the description of another. Rather,
the question is whether, by that work, the branch to which those
members belong infringes so substantially on the other branch that
the infringed-on branch cannot carry out its constitutionally assigned functions." 5 5 On that basis, Judge Becker could not find that
the functions conferred on the Comptroller by the Competition in
Contracting Act so coalesced powers in the Legislative Branch as to
threaten the interests or the functions of the Executive Branch, let
alone the interests of the aggrieved contract bidders. 5"
Then came Ameron II, spawned by the intervening Bowsher ruling that the Comptroller was so subservient to Congress that he
could not perform executive duties under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Judge Becker became the author of the panel majority
opinion in Ameron II, with Judge Garth writing a concurring opinion.
Judge Becker performed a tour deforce, much as he did in his Ameron I
concurrence. He accepted Bowsher's simplistic proposition that the
Comptroller is an agent of Congress and then immediately put that
proposition into the pragmatic balancing of interests. In so doing,
Judge Becker assessed the extent of the Comptroller's non-legislative functions under the Competition in Contracting Act, not under
53

54
55

Id. at 892 (Becker, J., concurring).
Id. at 893 (Becker, J., concurring).
Id. at 894 (Becker, J., concurring) (citing Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.

Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
56

Id. at 895 (Becker, J., concurring).
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the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.5 7 Whatever talismatic labels
might be placed on the Comptroller's functions under the latter act,
the assigned functions under the Competition in Contracting Act
were found to be reflective not of a legislative intent to take over
execution of this Act but of the legislative power "to investigate potential government misconduct in the execution of the procurement
laws, and to influence the executive's execution of the laws through
the power of public illumination and persuasion. '"58
Thus Ameron II properly put into the separation equation all the
Comptroller's functions ascribable to this congressional concern.
Whatever non-legislative label might be put on those functions, including the stay provision in question, the functions were weighed
by Ameron II as against any resulting or potential disruption or interference with the Executive Branch's ability to execute its assigned
tasks. Judge Becker concluded that the disruption, if any, was
"minimal." 5 9
Judge Garth's concurring opinion in Ameron II likewise rests on
an "empirical exercise in measuring the effect of the intrusion on
the coordinate branch" rather than on a "theoretical exercise in
questioning whether, in embryo, a dangerous violation of principle
lurks beneath an apparently benign legislative mechanism." 60 Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's analysis in Schor, he too reached
the conclusion that "the very limited power granted to the Comptroller General under [this Act] does not undermine the role of the
6
Executive Branch." 1

The Third Circuit panel ruling in United States v. Frank 62 is the
latest and most mature commitment of that court to the pragmatic
approach to separation of powers issues. It upheld on separation
grounds the validity of the federal sentencing guidelines by the judicial branch agency known as the Sentencing Commission. Exactly
the same problem was before the Supreme Court in Mistretta, which
was issued slightly more than two months after the Third Circuit's
5-7 Ameron 11, 809 F.2d 979, 983-86 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297
(1988).
58 Id. at 993.
59 Id. at 987.
60 Id. at 1000 (Garth, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 1001 (Garth, J., concurring).
62 864 F.2d 992 (3rd Cir. 1988). The panel majority opinion was written by
ChiefJudge Gibbons,joined by Circuit Judge Seitz. Circuit Judge Hutchison filed a
dissenting opinion on a non-constitutional point and thus did not reach "the issue
of the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines." Id. at 1016 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). See also Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction
to the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 435 (1974).
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decision in Frank.63 The Court's opinion in Mistretta used almost
exactly the same doctrinal analysis and reached exactly the same result as was foreshadowed in Frank.
Judge Gibbons' opinion in Frank attempts to classify the two
conflicting lines of Supreme Court precedents by distinguishing between alleged violations of "express textual provisions in the Constitution that deal with separation of powers" and alleged violations
of the separation doctrine that are based on "no specific textual provision of the Constitution. "64 In the former category are placed
such cases as Morrison v. Olson 6 5 (appointments clause), Bowsher v.
Synar 6 6 (appointments clause), Buckley v. Valeo 6 7 (appointments
clause), and Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha6 8 (article I
bicameral and presentment clauses). In the non-textual category
69
the Frank opinion places such cases as United States v. Nixon
(claimed presidential immunity not specified in Constitution) and
Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices7 (non-textual claim that Congress could not provide for taking custody of presidential materials).
The Frank opinion then asserts that the functional separation
analysis is more appropriate in the second or non-textual type of
challenges. "As it has been articulated by the Supreme Court,"
wrote Judge Gibbons, "the analysis of functional, as opposed to textual, alleged violations of the separation of powers doctrine does
not 'contemplate[] complete division of authority between the- three
branches,' but rather adopts a 'more pragmatic, flexible approach,'
associated with Madison (The Federalist No. 47), Mr. Justice Story
(Commentaries on the Constitution § 525), and Mr. Justice Jackson
(Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer).'
It may be questioned
whether the Court has consciously divided its separation analyses as
between textual and non-textual separation challenges; certainly it is
difficult to see that division evident in Morrison, where the Court ap63 Frank is one of the only two federal appellate rulings dealing with the validity
of the sentencing guidelines in light of the separation doctrine. For the Ninth Circuit ruling invalidating the guidelines, see Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d
1245 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez,
109 S. Ct. 859 (1989). In its Mistretta opinion, the Court took note of this conflict
between the Third and Ninth Circuits. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647,

654 n.6 (1988).
64 Frank, 864 F.2d at 1012-13.
65 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
66 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
67 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
68 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
61)
70

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
433 U.S. 425 (1977).

71

Frank, 864 F.2d 1013 (citation omitted).
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plied a pragmatic analysis in the context of a separation challenge
under the appointments clause.7 2
But however we may distinguish between the textual and the
non-textual separation challenges, the critical point of the Frank decision is its adherence to and application of the pragmatic test in
assessing a separation challenge to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission's guidelines. The court quite properly put on
one scale the interests and the purposes of Congress in establishing
the Commission. On the other scale, the court placed the amounts
of aggrandizement of power by one branch, and the impairment of
power of another branch, that inquiry could uncover. Asking the
same questions that the Supreme Court was later to ask in Mistretta,
the Third Circuit could find no undue aggrandizement of the power
of the Judicial Branch, and no unseemly impairment of the powers
of the Executive Branch or of the functioning of the judiciary.7 3
That being true, the court concluded that the need to promote the
objectives of Congress in establishing the Commission to create the
sentencing guidelines clearly outweighed the insignificant aggrandizement and impairment factors.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We can thus conclude that the Third Circuit has passed its
separation of powers test with high honors. It has faithfully adhered to the pragmatic teachings of the Supreme Court, while
deftly avoiding some of the Court's simplistic and historically un72 Cf. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1009 (1978). In assessing the validity of the one-House veto device in light of a
separation challenge, the court noted that the constitutional clause vesting legislative authority in Congress
does not itself, as a textual matter, mechanically direct the manner in
which Congress must exercise the legislative power. On that problem,
the core purpose of the clause must, of course, be taken into account (as
it has in appraising the extent of appropriate delegation), but there are
also other pertinent considerations, including the reach of the separation-of-powers doctrine and of the necessary and proper clause, as well
as the constitutional sphere of the Executive.
Id. at 1062. Several years later, however, the Supreme Court invalidated the oneHouse veto in Chadha, utilizing a simplistic analysis that contradicts the Atkins pragmatic analysis. Atkins still stands as the most enlightened judicial statement as to
the role of the one-house veto device in our blended tripartite form of government.
See also Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework,
52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other
Name?, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984).
73 Frank, 864 F.2d at 1013-16. The opinion categorized the argument about the
impairment of Executive Branch functions as "much ado about almost nothing."
Id. at 1014.
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sound lectures. It has remained true to the core meaning of the
separation doctrine. Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey once wrote that the doctrine
exists in one form or another in almost every American constitution; and it has nowhere been construed as creating three
mutually exclusive watertight compartments. To do so would
render government unworkable and the slave of a doctrine
that has for its beneficial purpose the prevention of despotism
that inevitably results from the concentration of all the powers
of government in one person or in one organ of government ....

While no rule of thumb will cover all the cases, in

general it may be said that no deviation from the constitutional provisions incorporating the doctrine of the separation
of powers will be tolerated which impairs the essential integrity of one of the great branches of government. 4
74 Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57, 71 A.2d 327, 329 (1950).

